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MISSOURI'S RESIDENCY
RESTRICTIONS FOR MEDICAL
MARIJUANA USE
1

Royce de R. Barondes1

Missouri’s adoption of a
constitutional amendment
decriminalizing medical
marijuana for state law
purposes has presented
numerous interstitial
issues. This article examines
one that Missouri’s Department
of Health and Senior Services
(“DHSS”) has attempted to
address by regulation:
residency requirements for
qualifying patients. The current
regulations add detail to the
constitutional requirement
that a qualifying patient be
a “Missouri resident.”2 They
require that a patient must
“reside[] in Missouri and not
claim resident privileges in
another state or country.”3 This

We can summarize our discussion as follows: The regulations have selected a narrow interpretation of the term
“resident.” The first step in examining the regulations is to
determine whether, but for their adoption, the constitutional
provision would be so interpreted. The narrow interpretation of “resident” is inconsistent with a number of principles
that generally apply to interpreting statutory or constitutional language: (i) language securing a civil right should be
broadly construed; (ii) the language should not be construed
so that different terms have the same meaning; and (iii) the
language should be construed so as to give effect to its evident purpose, not creating an unreasonable framework.
The second step is to examine the scope of authority
delegated to DHSS, to assess whether it has been authorized
to curtail the benefits of medical marijuana in this way. In
fact, the constitutional provision would appear to deny that
authority.

article concludes this aspect
of the regulations is of dubious
tenability.
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Interpretation of the Constitutional Provision on Its Own
General Meaning of “Resident”
Missouri restricts the purchase of medical marijuana to
residents.4 The term “resident” has multiple meanings. State
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v. Tustin notes, “We hesitate to essay any definition of ‘residence,’ for the word is like a slippery eel, and the definition
which fits one situation will wriggle out of our hands when
used in another context or in a different sense.”5 Black’s Law
Dictionary provides both narrow and broad definitions:
“1. Someone who lives permanently in a particular place;
specif., a person who has established a domicile in a given jurisdiction. 2. Someone who has a home in a particular place.
• In sense 2, a resident is not necessarily either a citizen or a
domiciliary.”6
In a variety of contexts, Missouri courts have concluded
that a person may be a resident of multiple places (or have a
residence at multiple places).7 In other contexts, the term is
used so that a person can be a “resident” of only one place at
a particular time.8 We can identify three guiding principles
in choosing among the options, each of which would urge a
broad understanding of “resident” in the context of Missouri’s medical marijuana regime.
Broad Construction of Civil Rights
As a general rule in the United States, civil rights statutes
are broadly construed.9 Missouri authority supports this
result through two steps. It provides for a broad (liberal) construction of “remedial” statutes.10 And a statute securing civil
rights is a remedial statute; a statute enacted “for the protection of life” meets the definition of a remedial statute.11
Missouri’s constitutional amendment decriminalizing
medical marijuana, under state law, comfortably fits within
the standard. It reflects a determination that a variety of
very serious medical conditions may be ameliorated by use of
marijuana.12 So, it necessarily was adopted “for the protection of life.”
Different Terms — “Resident” and “Citizen”
“The legislature’s use of different terms in different subsections of the same statute is presumed to be intentional and
for a particular purpose.”13 Although this principle is most
frequently applied to statutory language, the same principles
would seem applicable to understanding a constitutional
provision, and courts outside the Missouri judiciary have so
stated.14
The Missouri constitution requires marijuana facilities
to be “majority owned by natural persons who have been
citizens of the state of Missouri for at least one year prior to
the application.”15 Qualifying patients are not required to be
citizens. The constitutionally required nexus with Missouri
is they be “resident[s],” and it does not include a durational
limitation.16
In fact, Black’s Law Dictionary directs one to a meaning of
“resident” when used in contrast to “citizen”: “Someone who
has a home in a particular place.”17 That source thus would
direct one to a broad interpretation of the constitutional language, under which a person can have multiple residences.18
Reference to Purpose
In ascertaining the meaning of “resided” or “resident” in
a particular context, Missouri courts will look to the purpose
of the residency reference,19 and a construction yielding

“‘unreasonable or absurd results’”20 should be avoided. So,
for example, State v. Tustin states, “The meaning of the word
‘resident’ depends upon the purpose in the law where the
word is employed.”21 These principles, of course, are generally applicable in interpreting words that, in various contexts,
have different meanings.22
The types of circumstances that might typically give rise to
a requirement for a narrow interpretation of “resident” include: (i) to assure some nexus with others living in the community, so that the individual in question can properly represent, or be selected to represent, the broader community;23
(ii) to enhance performance of municipal employees;24
(iii) to prevent using benefits for which others have paid;25
and (iv) to prevent duplicative exercise of rights that inherently ought not be so exercised.26 None of these is implicated
in the context of using medical marijuana.
The most plausible reasons for requiring patients to have
a nexus with Missouri do not require a narrow definition of
residence.27 The state has an interest in preventing medical
marijuana tourism.28 It is possible that but for the residency
requirement, Kansas citizens, for example, might seek to get
Missouri credentials and travel to Missouri to acquire marijuana.29 This might be seen either as a problematic encroachment on federalism principles30 or as potentially increasing
undesirable trafficking within Missouri.
These factors might be of direct concern. Or they might be
indirectly of concern by influencing the likelihood of federal
intervention. The use of medical marijuana contemplated
by Missouri’s constitutional provision would remain criminal
under federal law.31 The interstate transport of marijuana,
which might be associated with allowing nonresidents to acquire medical marijuana in Missouri, implicates some of the
federal enforcement priorities referenced in the now-rescinded Cole Memo, which was issued by the U.S. Department of
Justice to guide federal prosecutors concerning marijuana
enforcement under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA).32
Compliance with the thrust of the memo may decrease the
likelihood of federal intervention, regardless of the ebb and
flow of the adoption of formal enforcement guidance.33
Although these reasons support maintaining some residency requirement for medical marijuana in Missouri, they
do not necessitate a narrowly defined one. The nonresident
recreational marijuana laws in Colorado34 and Illinois,35 for
example,36 may provide access to marijuana for persons from
neighboring states without the expense of either maintaining a second residence in Missouri or getting the required
Missouri medical certification. These alternatives mitigate
the incentive to select Missouri as a venue for servicing the
marijuana needs of persons without a legitimate nexus to
Missouri, even if there were a broad definition of “resident”
to be a qualifying medical marijuana patient under Missouri
law.
Additionally, a narrow definition of resident for Missouri’s
purposes may actually increase interstate transport of marijuana. It would do so by (i) forcing some who maintain residences in multiple states to transport marijuana across state
lines if they wish to use it to treat serious medical conditions
while at their Missouri residences; and (ii) decriminalizing
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under Missouri law the possession of that marijuana
transported interstate.
Consider a person who has a residence in Missouri but
acquires medical marijuana credentials elsewhere. Focus
on how a narrow interpretation of the term “resident” in
Missouri law treats this person. The out-of-state credentials
will operate as a defense to a criminal possession charge in
Missouri.37 But this individual cannot legally acquire medical marijuana in Missouri. So, he or she has an incentive, in
connection with travel to his or her Missouri residence, to
acquire it in quantity elsewhere and transport it to Missouri.
The initial purchase could be (i) in another state of residence,
(ii) in another state that allows purchases by visitors with
out-of-state credentials,38 or (iii) in a state that allows nonresident adult use.
The purpose of the restriction seems more naturally to
be concern for a state framework that entices individuals to
cross state lines to purchase marijuana. People who need to
use medical marijuana ought to be able to purchase it where
they live. This is not a right whose exercise at different times
provides a suitable substitute. So, if a person maintains a
residence in Missouri and needs to use medical marijuana,
he or she ought to be able to purchase it in Missouri. It is important that a person be permitted to purchase in Missouri if
he or she maintains both in-state and out-of-state residences.
That is because the interstate transport by a patient into Missouri is illegal under federal law. Federal prosecution for that
would appear to be unfettered,39 and that transport might
implicate the above-referenced enforcement priorities. In
fact, a framework under which being a resident in multiple
states would operate to prevent purchase of medical marijuana in Missouri could, in fact, increase interstate transport
and the likelihood of federal enforcement.
Additional Details of DHSS’s Limitation
As noted above,40 the regulations require a patient “resides
in Missouri and does not claim resident privileges in another
state or country.”41 This phrasing compounds the ambiguity.
The meaning of a statutory amendment is sometimes
informed by comparing changes in language,42 which may
clarify a purpose and thus intent. The same approach may
illuminate the meaning of the regulations.
The initial DHSS draft contemplated a person “primarily resides in Missouri, with the intention of permanently
or indefinitely residing in Missouri.”43 In voluntary, written comments on that initial drafted proposal, this author
noted that the proposal “would [have] disqualif[ied] . . . an
otherwise qualified person upon his or her determination to
leave the State of Missouri for a new job in the future.”44 It is
difficult to identify a plausible reason for allowing a decision
to move before acquiring a residence elsewhere — by itself to
disqualify a person. It would appear the change was intended to address that circumstance. The regulations as adopted
address that issue: a mere change in mental state, reflecting
an intention to leave, is not by itself sufficient to disqualify
one from medical marijuana.
But the adopted regulation does not clarify whether the
claim of residency elsewhere, disqualifying one from Missouri
medical marijuana, is residency elsewhere: (i) for a broad
114

range of purposes; (ii) for purposes of medical marijuana; or
(iii) for any purpose whatsoever. None seems suitable.
Only Broad Range of Out-of-State Residence Privileges
If the reference is to claiming broad residence privileges
elsewhere, that understanding would seem to be as invalid as
equating citizenship with residence. As noted above,45 citizenship is elsewhere referenced in the constitutional provision.
So, to use “resident” in the narrow form, as essentially equivalent to “citizen,” would require one of two circumstances:
(i) There is some reason for having a gossamer distinction between residence for purposes of determining qualifying patients and citizenship for purposes
of determining permitted facility owners. No reason
is apparent for this choice; or
(ii) The object of this part of the regulations is
to select a definition of resident that is inconsistent
with the principle that different terms have different meanings. The regulations elsewhere appear
to clarify that this is what the authors of the regulations intended. As to ownership of facilities, the
regulations expressly state, “For the purposes of this
requirement, citizen means resident.”46
Out-of-State Resident Medical Marijuana
The second alternative is that qualifying to buy medical
marijuana out-of-state, under another state’s regime, is sufficient to prevent being a qualifying patient in Missouri. This
understanding has little to commend it. Missouri law would
allow such a person to possess marijuana in Missouri.47 But
he or she would be required to transport it interstate or to
buy it in-state in an illegal transaction. So, the law would promote the kind of activity the Cole Memo finds of concern.
Any Resident Privilege
Little needs to be said as to the possibility that an exercise
of any resident privilege out-of-state is sufficient to deny a
Missouri resident access to medical marijuana. Entirely unrelated conduct is not plausibly intended to deprive a person of
what Missouri voters thought suitable to allow people to treat
serious medical conditions.
Authority of DHSS to Narrow Residency
The validity of a DHSS rule narrowing the definition of
“resident” from that which otherwise would obtain depends
on the scope of authority expressly granted to the department. There can be an express authorization to interpret
statutory or constitutional language. For example, one
statute references “rules and regulations within the scope
and purview of the provisions of [certain] sections . . . as the
director considers necessary and proper for the effective
administration and interpretation of the provisions of [those]
sections.”48 However, DHSS has not been granted so broad
an authority.
The most pertinent express authorization to promulgate
rules concerning medical marijuana that is granted to DHSS
includes the following:
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(i) The DHSS is authorized to “[p]romulgate rules
and emergency rules necessary for the proper regulation and control of the . . . dispensing[] and sale
of marijuana for medical use and for the enforcement of this [the constitutional amendment] so long
as patient access is not restricted unreasonably and
such rules are reasonably necessary for patient safety
or to restrict access to only licensees and qualifying
patients.”49
(ii) “The department shall issue any rules or emergency rules necessary for the implementation and
enforcement of this section and to ensure the right
to, availability, and safe use of marijuana for medical
use by qualifying patients.”50
(iii) “The department shall not have the authority
to apply or enforce any rule or regulation that would
impose an undue burden on any one or more licensees or certificate holders, any qualifying patients, or
act to undermine the purposes of this section.”51
The first provision limits authority to promulgate rules
“necessary . . . for . . . enforcement.” That does not authorize identifying a class of persons DHSS can disqualify. The
second provision is limited to rules “necessary for the implementation and enforcement” of the section. That as well does
not expressly authorize the exclusion of a class of persons
who could otherwise be qualifying.
The third quoted provision would expressly negate the
authority to identify an additional class of persons who are
disqualified, if either of the prior two arguably allowed that
(which neither does). The third expressly prohibits “an
undue burden on . . . any qualifying patients.” Because a
complete prohibition is inherently an undue burden, DHSS
has been expressly prohibited from excluding from the definition of “qualifying patient” an entire class of persons who
otherwise would be qualifying patients.
In sum, the express authority to promulgate rules does
not include the authority to adopt a definition of “qualify-

ing patient” that is more restrictive than the definition in the
constitutional amendment itself, as informed by the context
of the usage.
In fact, it would appear that, in another context, a Missouri court has invalidated a rule having greater textual support than the one at hand. McNeil–Terry v. Roling52 involves
Missouri statutes that included dental services in Medicaid.
A statute provided for payments made for reasonable charges
“for the services as defined and determined by the division of
medical services . . . for . . . (7) Dental services.”53 The express authority to promulgate rules provided, “[T]he division
of medical services shall by rule and regulation define the
reasonable costs, manner, extent, quantity, quality, charges
and fees of medical assistance herein provided.”54 So, an
agency could “define[] and determine[]” the dental services,
and then “define the[ir] reasonable costs . . . [and] quantity
. . . .” But, a court concluded, in fact, the agency did not have
the authority to determine what dental services would be
covered.
Following enactment of a lean budget, which the court
describes as having “eliminated funding for Medicaid adult
dental services,”55 the agency adopted a rule “which provided in part that only dentures and treatment of trauma to
the mouth or teeth as a result of injury were covered dental
services for Medicaid-eligible adults.”56
The court rejected the agency’s argument that “it merely
exercised its authority to ‘define’ the Medicaid dental services
program.”57 The court, in conclusory fashion, asserted the
choice was not merely defining services but something different —“drastically curtail[ing]” them.58 The opinion fails to
grapple with applying the express authority of the agency to
determine services.59 Rather, the court pronounces there is a
statutory requirement “to provide general ‘dental services’”60
that is not met by the limited services administratively defined, although the statute did not require “general” dental
services.61
continued on page 136
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Medical Marijuana Use
Continued from page 115

The delegated authority to promulgate rules abridging
entitlements was greater in McNeil–Terry than is granted to
DHSS as to defining residents for medical marijuana purposes. Yet McNeil–Terry invalidates the rule that restrictively
defines the scope of benefited activity.
A second illustration involves a regulation interpreting a
term that, by itself, is ambiguous. Union Electric Co. v. Director
of Revenue62 involves whether the term “processing,” as used
in a statutory tax exemption, encompasses baking items in
the bakery sections of grocery stores.63 A regulation stated
that a bakery qualified for the exemption.64 Relevant to our
purposes,65 the court addressed the validity of regulations
providing that activities of a bakery involve “processing,” as
that term was used in the statute. As to this, the court states:
While administrative regulations are “entitled to a
presumption of validity and may ‘not be overruled
except for weighty reasons,’” “[t]he rules or regulations of a state agency are invalid if they are beyond
the scope of authority conferred upon the agency, or
if they attempt to expand or modify statutes.”66
The opinion elsewhere concludes that, without reference
to the rule, a bakery’s on-site thawing, cooking, etc., do not
constitute processing, applying principles including noscitur
a sociis.67 That is a principle only applicable to ambiguous
language.68 From this circumstance, we can deduce the following principle: That statutory language that is ambiguous
is not, by itself, sufficient to require a court to defer to an administrative interpretation selecting one of multiple possible
meanings. And somewhat interestingly, this does not seem to
depend on the agency having been given a narrow scope of
authority to promulgate rules — the court’s analysis, insofar
as there is one, does not address that.
Union Electric is also comparable, in another way, to our
question of defining “resident” for medical marijuana
purposes. Union Electric involves exemptions from taxation.
Interpretative principles call for such exemptions to be construed narrowly.69 As circumstances would have it, as noted
above,70 there is a corresponding interpretative principle
associated with interpreting the term “resident” for medical
marijuana purposes. The reference to “resident” is in a civil
rights statute — a statute of a type that is broadly construed
both in Missouri and elsewhere.71 So, there is not automatic
deference to an administrative rule:
(i) providing an expansive definition of a term that,
devoid of context, is ambiguous in a statute subject to
a restrictive interpretation (Union Electric); or
(ii) providing a narrow definition of a term that,
devoid of context, is ambiguous in a constitutional
provision subject to a broad interpretation (interpreting
“resident” for medical marijuana purposes).
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These illustrations would seem to support the notion a
court should not defer to the agency’s determination as to
the meaning of “resident.” And it bears mention that one can
see reference to even more intrusive judicial review in older
authority.72
Conclusion
DHSS has on two occasions sought to define restrictively
those persons who qualify as Missouri residents and thus
might, with appropriate medical certification, become authorized to purchase, possess, and use medical marijuana in
Missouri. The initial proposal contemplated a person who
“primarily resides in Missouri, with the intention of permanently or indefinitely residing in Missouri.”73 One supposes
that provision, automatically denying medical marijuana to
a person upon his or her decision to leave Missouri, to be
entirely irrational. DHSS’s second effort limits medical marijuana to persons who “reside[] in Missouri and do[] not claim
resident privileges in another state or country.”74
The current regulations, although not as restrictive, also
would appear to be infirm. There is not a good reason why
individuals maintaining residences in Missouri ought to
have their access to medical marijuana in Missouri depend
on whether they also claim “resident privileges in another
state.” The restrictive definition is contrary to the principle
that a grant of civil rights is to be broadly construed.75 And,
it disregards the distinction that is ordinarily a consequence
of using different terms in the same provision.76 Elsewhere
the constitutional amendment references “citizens.”77 But
the definition provided by DHSS leaves little room between
its narrow definition of “resident” and what the law would
provide were qualifying patients limited to Missouri citizens
— the latter being something the constitutional provision
would appear to have rejected. In fact, contrary to this interpretative principle, the regulations elsewhere define “citizen”
as meaning “resident.”78
Additionally, the Missouri constitution does not expressly
provide DHSS with the authority to set a more limited definition of the term “resident.” Rather, the constitutional provision prohibits “any rule or regulation that would impose an
undue burden on . . . any qualifying patients.”79 So, under
ordinary principles, it would appear a court should not validate this aspect of DHSS’s rules.
Endnotes

Royce
Barondes

1 Royce Barondes is the James S. Rollins
Professor of Law at the University of Missouri.
His academic scholarship has focused on business organizations and securities regulation and,
more recently, the law of contracts and firearms
law, all subjects he has taught. In the just completed academic year, he developed and taught a
new class in the Regulation of Medical-Marijuana
Businesses. In April 2019, he submitted comments on draft rules that were the predecessors
of the rules discussed in this article.
2 mo. const. art. XIV, § 1.2(16).
3 19 C.S.R. § 30–95.030(2)(A)(3) (Dec. 31,
2019). There are other theories on which one
might seek to challenge a residency requirement.
A claim under the Privileges and Immunities
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2299.
4 mo. const. art. XIV, § 1.2(16).
5 322 S.W.2d 179, 180 (Mo. App. S.D. 1959), abrogation recognized by State
ex inf. Dalton v. Riss & Co., 335 S.W.2d 118, 129 (Mo. banc 1960). That case
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the conclusion that the definition of “residence” is “like a slippery eel,” but
that of “resident” is not. See generally George v. Jones, 317 S.W.3d 662, 666
n.3 (Mo. App. S.D. 2010) (providing the following as text of a parenthetical
summarizing Barrett v. Parks, 180 S.W.2d 665, 666 (Mo. 1944): “reside and
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6 Resident, Black’s laW dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
7 E.g., Pruitt v. Farmers Ins. Co., 950 S.W.2d 659, 663 (Mo. App. S.D. 1997)
(examining insurance coverage); State ex rel. Quest Commc’ns Corp. v. Baldridge,
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see also infra note 25. See generally § 1.020, RSMo (2016) (defining “[p]lace of
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9 E.g., shamBie singer, 3C sutherland statutes & statutory construction § 76:5 (8th ed.) (Westlaw database updated Oct. 2019) (“A ‘remedial
statute’ such as a civil rights law is one enacted for the protection of life
and property and to introduce regulations conducive to the public good
and is liberally construed to effectuate its purpose. A liberal construction
can expand the meaning of a statute to meet cases which are clearly within
the spirit or reason of the law, but courts cannot provide an interpretation
inconsistent with the statute’s language.” (footnote omitted)).
10 Lampley v. Missouri Comm’n on Human Rights, 570 S.W.3d 16, 23 (Mo.
banc 2019) (plurality opinion) (“‘Remedial statutes should be construed
liberally to include those cases which are within the spirit of the law and all
reasonable doubts should be construed in favor of applicability to the case.’”
(quoting Mo. Comm’n on Human Rights v. Red Dragon Rest., Inc., 991 S.W.2d
161, 166–67 (Mo. App. W.D. 1999)).
11 Hagan v. Dir. of Revenue, 968 S.W.2d 704, 706 (Mo. banc 1998) (“[A] remedial statute is a statute enacted for the protection of life and property and
in the interest of public welfare.”). This principle has been applied, for example, in construing a section of the Missouri Human Rights Act, § 213.055,
RSMo (2000). Lampley, 570 S.W.3d at 19, 23 (concerning the claims of a gay
man alleging sex discrimination arising from alleged sexual stereotyping).
12 mo. const. art XIV, § 1.2(15) (including, for example, cancer, acquired
immune deficiency syndrome, and “[a]ny terminal illness” as “qualifying
medical condition[s]”).
13 State v. Moore, 303 S.W.3d 515, 520 (Mo. banc 2010). See also, e.g., Alberici Constructors, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 452 S.W.3d 632, 637 (Mo. banc 2015)
(“The legislature’s use of different terms in the same statute is presumed to
be intentional.”); McAlister v. Strohmeyer, 395 S.W.3d 546, 552 (Mo. App. W.D.
2013).
14 Lathrop v. Deal, 801 S.E.2d 867, 890 (Ga. 2017); Teverbaugh ex rel. Duncan v. Moore, 724 N.E.2d 225, 229 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
15 mo. const. art. XIV, § 1.7(3).
16 mo. const. art. XIV, § 1.2(16).
17 Resident, Black’s laW dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
18 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
19 State v. Tustin, 322 S.W.2d 179, 181 (Mo. App. S.D. 1959) (quoted
by State ex rel. Quest Commc’ns Corp. v. Baldridge, 913 S.W.2d 366, 369 (Mo.
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22 E.g., State ex rel. Stinger v. Krueger, 217 S.W. 310, 315 (Mo. banc 1919)
(“The word ‘or’ in statutes or documents is frequently interpreted to mean
‘and,’ and this interpretation is given to it whenever required to carry out
the plain purpose of the act or contract, and when to adopt the literal meaning would defeat the purpose or lead to an absurd result.”).
23 Lewis, 80 S.W.3d at 466 (“The purpose of residency statutes is to ensure
that governmental officials are sufficiently connected to their constituents to
serve them with sensitivity and understanding.”).
24 Perry v. City of St. Louis Civil Serv. Comm’n, 924 S.W.2d 861, 864 n.1 (Mo.
App. E.D. 1996); see also, e.g., Krzewinski v. Kugler, 338 F. Supp. 492, 500
(D.N.J. 1972).
25 Cf. Binde v. Klinge, 30 Mo. App. 285, 289 (Mo. App. E.D. 1888) (stating,
as to a provision allowing tuition charges to non-residents, “[I]t is well known
that some communities in the state, more wealthy, more public-spirited, or
more disposed to tax themselves to foster a good system of common-school
instruction than other communities, are burdened by migrations of children
from other communities, who, on various pretexts, seek to avail themselves
of the superior privileges which their schools afford without the payment of
tuition.”).
26 See Barrett v. Parks, 180 S.W.2d 665, 666 (Mo. 1944) (addressing suffrage).
27 There are a number of reasons why a closer nexus with Missouri is
required as to facility ownership, where the constitutional amendment
references Missouri citizenship (as to ownership of facilities). This close
nexus may reflect protectionism (which is not to say this objective would
be legitimate). It may be to diminish the likelihood of federal enforcement. See Joseph Hughs, Trusts and Estate Planning in Light of Missouri
Residency Requirements, at 4–5 (n.d.). Relevant considerations could be
restricting the flow of funds from marijuana operations to persons outside
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Cole Memo references. Memo from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney Gen.,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to all U.S. Attorneys, Guidance Regarding Marijuana
Enforcement, at 1 (Aug. 29, 2013, https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf.) These activities may be better monitored
by Missouri where the owners have a primary connection to Missouri.
Additionally, at one time the mere size of a business could enhance the likelihood of federal enforcement. Cole Memo, supra, at 4. So, limiting Missouri
facilities to those that are majority-owned by Missouri citizens may exclude
multi-state conglomerate participation.
28 See generally Denning, supra note 3, at 2279, 2282.
29 Missouri has a rather broadly defined set of qualifying conditions. See
mo. const. art. XIV, § 1.2(15)(j) (including the following language, which
precedes a lengthy list: “[i]n the professional judgment of a physician, any
other chronic, debilitating or other medical condition, including, but not
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